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ABSTRACT
Biological evolution is a complex blend of ever changing
structural stability, variability and emergence of new phe-
notypes, niches, ecosystems. We wish to argue that the evo-
lution of life marks the end of a physics world view of law
entailed dynamics. Our considerations depend upon dis-
cussing the variability of the very ”contexts of life”: the in-
teractions between organisms, biological niches and ecosys-
tems. These are ever changing, intrinsically indeterminate
and even unprestatable: we do not know ahead of time the
”niches” which constitute the boundary conditions on selec-
tion. More generally, by the mathematical unprestatability
of the ”phase space” (space of possibilities), no laws of mo-
tion can be formulated for evolution. We call this radical
emergence, from life to life. The purpose of this paper is
the integration of variation and diversity in a sound concep-
tual frame and situate unpredictability at a novel theoretical
level, that of the very phase space.
Our argument will be carried on in close comparisons with
physics and the mathematical constructions of phase spaces
in that discipline. The role of (theoretical) symmetries as
invariant preserving transformations will allow us to under-
stand the nature of physical phase spaces and to stress the
differences required for a sound biological theoretizing. In
this frame, we discuss the novel notion of ”enablement”. Life
lives in a web of enablement and radical emergence. This
will restrict causal analyses to differential cases (a difference
that causes a difference). Mutations or other causal differ-
ences will allow us to stress that ”non conservation princi-
ples” are at the core of evolution, in contrast to physical
dynamics, largely based on conservation principles as sym-
metries. Critical transitions, the main locus of symmetry
changes in physics, will be discussed, and lead to ”extended
criticality” as a conceptual frame for a better understanding
of the living state of matter.
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1. OVERVIEW
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the mode of
understanding in physics since Newton, namely differential
equations, initial and boundary conditions, then integration
which constitutes deduction, which in turn constitutes “en-
tailment”, fails fundamentally for the evolution of life. No
law in the physical sense, we will argue, entails the evolu-
tion of life. If we are correct, this spells the end of “strong
reductionism”, the long held belief that a set of laws “down
there” entails all that happens in the universe. More, if no
law entails the evolution of life, yet the biosphere is the most
complex system we know of in the universe, it has managed
to come into existence without an entailing law. Then such
law is not necessary for extraordinary complexity to arise
and thrive. We need new ways to think about how cur-
rent life organization can have come into being and persists.
Those ways include coming to understand how what we will
call organisms as “Kantian wholes” co-create their worlds
with one another.
The heart of our considerations are these: 1) In physics,
we can prestate the configuration space or phase space, a cru-
cial notion in this paper. Dynamics are geodetics within such
prestated phase spaces, which may be very abstract, like in
Quantum Mechanics. 2) In biological evolution, the phase
space itself changes persistently. More it does so in ways that
cannot be prestated. 3) Because we cannot prestate the ever
changing phase space of biological evolution, we have no set-
tled relations by which we can write down the “equations of
motion” of the ever new biologically “relevant observables
and parameters” revealed after the fact by selection acting
on Kantian wholes in biological evolution, but that we can-
not prestate. More, we cannot prestate the adaptive “niche”
as a boundary condition, so could not integrate the equa-
tions of motion even were we to have them. 4) If the above
is true, no law entails the evolution of the biosphere. 5) If by
“cause”, we mean what gives a differential effect entailed by
law, then we can assign no cause in the “diachronic” evolu-
tion of the biosphere. 6) In place of“cause” in this diachronic
evolution, we will find “enablement”, ie making possible – a
key notion in our analysis. 7) Our thesis does not obviate
reductive explanations of organisms as synchronic entities,
such as an ultimate physical account of the behavior of an
existing heart, once evolved1.
Our analysis is centered on cells and organisms as Kan-
tian wholes, where the whole exists for and by means of the
parts, and the parts for and by means of the whole. Given
a Kantian whole, the “function” of a part in sustaining the
whole is definable. Other synchronic causal consequences are
irrelevant side effects. An essential feature of our analysis
is that at levels of complexity above the atom, for example
for molecules, the universe is grossly non-ergodic, that is it
does not explore all possible paths or configurations. We
will not make all possible proteins length 200 amino acids
in 10 to the 39th times the lifetime of the universe, even
were all 10 to the 80th particles making such proteins on
the Planck time scale. Thus, the existence in the universe of
a heart, which Darwin tells us is due to its selective advan-
tage in a sequence of descendant, Kantian whole organisms,
is physically important: Most complex things will not ever
exist. Thus Darwin’s theory is telling us how hearts exist
in the universe. Kantian wholes, married to self reproduc-
tion and Darwinian evolution, are part of the non-ergodic,
historical becoming of the universe, and, we claim, beyond
entailing law. A deep aspect of the freedom from entailing
law in the evolution of organisms is that the possible “uses”
of a given part or process of an organism are, both indefinite
and unorderable, in our views, thus, a fortiori, no effective
procedure, or algorithm can list them. Thus when selec-
tion acts at the level of the whole organism, we cannot have
pre-listed the newly relevant functional features of its parts
revealed by selection. It follows that we cannot prestate the
ever changing relevant observables and variables revealed by
selection, so — our main theme — cannot write equations
of motion for the evolving biosphere. Nor can we in gen-
eral prestate the boundary conditions on selection, i.e. the
“niche”, so we could not integrate the equations of motion
that we do not have anyway. In short, no law entails the
evolution of the biosphere, nor, more specifically, of an or-
ganism phylogenetic trajectory. Moreover, we claim, niches
and ecosystems ”enable” the formation of life, and causal
relations should be seen only in differential effects.
The key argument will be given in reference and contrast
to the role of symmetries and conservation laws in physics.
We will show that symmetries and the mathematics of in-
variants and invariant preserving transformations cannot be
transferred as such to suitable theoretical frames for biology,
in particular to analyses of biological evolution. We will note
that the construction of phase spaces for physics has been
largely, or even exclusively, based on invariant properties
of ”trajectories”, ie on symmetries. This fails in biological
theoretizing, since phylogenetic trajectories may be viewed
as continual symmetry changes. In our perspective, these
continual symmetry changes are correlated to unprestatable
changes of the state space itself. Of course, the key point,
extensively stressed below, is the proposal of the suitable
1The intrinsic unpredictability (or non-pre-definability) of
the biological phase space was first hinted in [15] and, on
different grounds in [4] and in the orginal version, in French,
Hermann, 2006; see also [16, 3].
observables in biology. These are dictated by the chosen
theory. For us, this is Darwin’s Evolution.
In this theoretical frame, we cannot prestate or list the
possible selective biological environments, in view of the
provable impossibility to prestate the intended ”coherence
structures” and their symmetries. As a consequence, the
set of objects or processes able to carry out a given use,
or Kantian function, is also indefinite and unorderable, so
not enumerable. But such ever novel parts and processes
as adaptations and Darwinian preadaptations arise all the
time, often by quantum indeterminate, acausal, random mu-
tations, and find a use, and often a novel function as parts in
the organism in an unprestatable selective environment, so
are grafted into the organism, thereby changing the phase
space of evolution, we will argue, in an unprestatable, in-
compressible, way. Concurrently, we note that we can think
of a reproducing cell or organism as achieving a “task clo-
sure” in some set of tasks, such as mitosis, the behavior
of chemosmotic pumps and so on. But this task closure is
achieved via the biotic and abiotic environment. But only
selection acting at the level of the Kantian wholes, reveals
after the fact, the newly relevant features of the organism
and the environment that constitute the task closure and the
new“niche” of the now surviving organism. In short, the or-
ganism and its niche, are co-constituted in a circular way
that cannot be prestated. Again, we will argue that no laws
of motion, nor boundary condition to integrate such laws
were we to have them, can be formulated. No law entails
the evolution of the biosphere.
Finally, and stunningly, evolution creates, without selec-
tion acting to do so, new “adjacent possible empty niches”
which enable new possible directions of evolution. This is
radical emergence from life to life. Further, the evolution of
a new organism to live in a new “adjacent possible empty
niche”, often arises due to one or a sequence of quantum
events, at the molecular level, which are acausal. Thus the
niche does not cause, but “enables” the radical emergence.
Not only is life caught in a web of causes, it is part of a
co-constituting web of enablement and radical emergence.
If correct, reductionism reaches a terminus at the water-
shed of life. With Heraclitus we say of life: The world bub-
bles forth.
2. PHYSICAL PHASE SPACES.
In order to understand the specific difficulties of biological
theoretizing, we will first shortly recall the role of “phase
spaces” in physical theories.
In physics, the phase space is given by the pertinent ob-
servables and parameters. As we will recall below, these
may be, for example, the momentum and position, or energy
and time. In Hamiltonian classical mechanics and in Quan-
tum Physics, these observables and variables happen to be
“conjugated”, an expression of their tight relation and per-
tinence. These mathematical spaces are the spaces in which
the trajectories are determined: even in Quantum Physics,
when taking Hilbert’s spaces as phase spaces for the wave
function, Schro¨dinger’s equation determines the dynamics
of a probability density and the indeterministic aspect of
quantum mechanics appears when quantum measurement
projects the state vector.
As a matter of fact, one of the major challenges for a (the-
oretical) physicist is to invent the right (pertinent) spaces
or phase space. Well before the invention of the notion of
“phase space”, Newton’s analysis of trajectories was fully
embedded in Descartes spaces, a “condition of possibility”,
Kant will explain, for physics to be done. By this, New-
ton unified (he did not reduce) Galileo’s analysis of falling
bodies, including apples, to planetary orbits. Then New-
ton derived Kepler’s ellipsis of a planet around the Sun
from his equations; this is the astonishing birth of mod-
ern mathematical-physics as capable of predicting exactly a
trajectory inside the theory. But, since Poincare´, we know
that if the planets around the Sun are two, prediction is im-
possible due to determinsitic chaos. Their trajectories are
fully determined by Newton-Laplace equations; but in this
case, though, their non-linearity yields the absence almost
everywhere of analytic solutions and forbids predictability,
even along well determined trajectories at equilibrium, in
perfectly pre-defined phase spaces.
Poincare´’s analysis of chaotic dynamics was essentially
based on his invention of the so-called Poincare´ section (an-
alyze planetary orbits only by their crossing a given plane)
and of the use of momentum as a key observable. In his
analysis of chaoticity, stable and unstable trajectories in the
position-momentum phase space, nearly intersect infinitely
often, in “infinitely tight meshes” and are also “folded upon
themselves without ever intersecting themselves”, (1892).
As for thermodynamics, the physicists Boyle, Carnot and
Gay Lussac decided to focus on pressure, volume and tem-
perature, as the relevant observables: the phase space2 was
chosen in view of its pertinence, totally disregarding the fa-
miliar fact that gases are made out of particles. Boltzmann
later unified the principles of thermodynamic to a parti-
cle’s viewpoint and later to Newtonian trajectories by the
ergodic hypothesis: no reduction to Newtonian trajectories,
rather a unification at the infinite time limit of the thermo-
dynamic integral, under the novel assumption of “molecular
chaos”, an“asymptotic”unification, rather extraneous to the
Newton-Laplace theory of movement.
We already mentioned Schro¨dinger’s invention of a suit-
able phase space for the state function in Quantum Mechan-
ics: the very abstract Hilbert space of probability densities,
very far form ordinary space-time.
As a matter of fact, we claim that these conceptual /
mathematical constructions of a pre-given phase space do
not apply to biology and we will motivate this by different
levels of analysis. First we will discuss naive constructions of
a microscopic phase space in biology, then we will show that
evolution leads to continual unprestatable changes in phase
spaces and finally we will analyse the role of symmetries
and conservation properties in physics, which are, instead,
continually broken or changed in biological dynamics. This
yields the impossibility of proposing a pre-given biologically
pertinent phase space, which would accommodate all possi-
ble phylogenetic trajectories. Therefore and most critically,
we cannot write equations of motion for the evolving bio-
sphere, nor prestate the niche boundary conditions, which
therefore does not allow us to integrate the equations of mo-
tion we do not have anyway.
2The term phase space is often restricted to a posi-
tion/momentum space; we use it in this text in the general
sense of the suitable/intended space of the mathematical
and/or theoretical description of the system.
3. BIOLOGY AND MICROPHYSICAL DE-
SCRIPTIONS: NON-ERGODICITY AND
QUANTUM EFFECTS.
There are some immediate difficulties with the “naive”ap-
proach to the construction of a phase space in biology. We
will discuss the question of ergodicity and the combination
of quantum and classical phenomena in evolution.
As mentioned in the overview, an easy combinatorial ar-
gument shows that even at the time scale of the Universe,
all possible macromolecules, or even proteins of length 200
amino acids cannot be explored. So, their “composition” in
a new organ or organism (thus, in a phenotype) cannot be
the result of the ergodicity of physical dynamics3. Because
of this non-ergodicity, history enters. More, most complex
things will never exist. Later, in discussing Kantian wholes
where the parts exist for and by means of the whole and the
whole for and by means of the parts, the physical relevance
is that in the non-ergodic universe, hearts and humans, via
evolution, do exist in the universe.
We should first compare this situation with the role of er-
godicity in statistical mechanics. The basic assumption of
(most) statistical mechanics is a symmetry between states
with the same energetic level, which allows us to analyze
their probabilities (on the relevant time scales). This as-
sumption is grounded on an hypothesis of ergodicity as for
the dynamics of the particles: in the limit of infinite time,
they “go everywhere” in the intended phase space. In this
case, the situation is described on the basis of energetic con-
siderations (energy conservation properties, typically), with-
out having to take into account the Newtonian trajectory or
the history of the system.
In biology, the non-ergodicity in the molecular phase space
allows us to argue that the dynamic cannot be described
without temporal considerations, even when one considers
only the molecular aspects of biological systems, let alone
morphological aspects. In other terms, even in the tentative
phase space of molecules, the relevant symmetries depends
on history, in contrast to statistical mechanics.
Note that some cases of non-ergodicity are well studied in
physics. Symmetry breaking phase transitions is a simple
example: a crystal does not explore all its possible config-
urations because it has privileged directions and it “sticks”
to them, see [28] for a mathematical analysis. However, a
more interesting case is given by glasses. Depending on the
models, the actual non-ergodicity is in infinite time or due
to the relevant time scales, but crucially it corresponds to
a variety of states, depending on the paths in the energetic
landscape that are taken (or not taken) during the cooling.
This can be analyzed as an entropic distance to thermody-
namic equilibrium. While this corresponds to a wide variety
of “choices”, these various states are very similar and their
differences are relatively well described by the introduction
of a time dependence for the usual thermodynamical quan-
tities. This corresponds to the so-called “aging dynamics”
[14]. Glassy dynamics shows that the absence of a relevant
ergodicity is not sufficient in order to obtain phase space
3Notice here that this argument only states that ergodicity
in the molecular phase space does not help to understand the
biological dynamics. The argument allows trajectories to be
ergodic in infinite time. We can then say that ergodicity
is biologically irrelevant and can take this irrelevance as a
principle.
changes in our sense, because in this example the various
states can be understood in a stable phase space and are
not qualitatively different.
As for biology, evolution is both the result of random
events at all levels of organization of life and of constraints
that canalize it, in particular by excluding, by selection, in-
compatible random explorations. So, ergodic explorations
are also restricted or prevented both by selection and the
history of the organism. For example, the presence and the
structure of a membrane, or a nucleus, in a cell canalizes
also the whole cellular activities along a restricted form of
possible dynamics4.
We find it critical that neither quantum mechanics alone,
nor classical physics alone, account for evolution. Both seem
to work together. Mutations can be random, acausal, inde-
terminate quantum events. Yet, they may interfere or hap-
pen simultaneously to or be amplified by classical dynamics
(see [6]). In this amplification, evolution is also not ran-
dom, as seen in the stunning similarity of the octopus and
vertebrate camera eye, independently evolved. Thus evolu-
tion is both indeterminate, random and acausal, and yet non
random. It is indeed not sufficiently described by quantum
mechanics alone or classical mechanics alone. Life is new.
In other words, classical and quantum randomness super-
pose and are essential to variability, thus diversity, thus life.
None of them is noise. The enthalpic chaotic oscillations of
macro-molecules have a classical nature, in physical terms,
and are essential to the interaction with DNA and RNA.
Quantum randomness of mutation is typically amplified by
classical dynamics (including classical randomness), in the
interaction between DNA and the proteome, for example.
This kind of amplification is necessary in order to under-
stand that changes at the nanometer scale impact the phe-
notype of the cell or of the organism. Moreover, it is consis-
tent to consider the cell-to-cell interactions and, more gen-
erally, ecosystem’s interactions as classical, at least as for
their physical aspects, yet affecting the biological observ-
ables, jointly with quantum phenomena. Some examples
of relevant quantum phenomena are electron tunneling in
cellular respiration [13], electron transport along DNA [31],
quantum coherence in photosynthesis [10, 8]. Moreover, it
has been shown that double proton transfer affects sponta-
neous mutation in RNA duplexes [7].
When a (random) quantum event at the molecular level
(DNA or RNA-DNA or RNA-protein or protein-protein) has
consequences at the level of the phenotype, the somatic con-
sequences may persist if they are compatible with the ecosys-
tem and with the ever changing “coherence structure” of the
organism as constructed along its history. In particular, it
may allow the formation of a new function, organ or tool
or different use of an existing tool, thus to the formation
of a new properly relevant biological observable. This new
observable has at least the same level of unpredictability as
the quantum event, but it does not belong to the quantum
phase space: it is subject to Darwinian selection at the level
of a population, typically, thus it interacts with the ecosys-
tem as such. This is the pertinent level of observability,
the space of phenotypes, where biological randomness and
unpredictability is now to be analyzed.
Note also that the effects of the classical / quantum blend
4See [20] for an analysis of the taking place of molecular
spatial heterogeneity in the membrane, by the coupling of
phase transition fluctuations and the cytoskeleton.
may show up at a different level of observability and may
retroact. First, a mutation or a random difference in the
genome, may contribute to the construction of a new phe-
notype. Second, this phenotype may retroact downwards,
to the molecular (or quantum) level. A molecular activity
may be excluded, as appearing in cells (organs / organisms)
which turn out to be unfit — selection acts at the level of
organisms; methylation and demethylation downwards mod-
ify the expression of “genes”. These upwards and downwards
activities are part of what we called and discuss more below
to be the“Kantian whole”, as they contribute to the integra-
tion and regulation of and by the whole and the parts. They
both contribute to and constrain the biological dynamics
and, thus, they do not allow one to split the different levels
of organization into independent phase spaces.
4. KANTIAN WHOLE AND SELECTION
Before specifying further our approach to biological ob-
jects, we have first to challenge the Cartesian and Laplacian
view that the fundamental is always elementary and that
the elementary is always simple. According to this view, in
biology only the molecular analysis would be fundamental.
Galileo and Einstein proposed fundamental theories of
gravitation and inertia, with no references to Democritus’
atoms nor quanta composing their falling bodies or planets.
Then, Einstein, and still now physicists, struggle for unifi-
cation, not reduction of the relativistic field to the quantum
one. Boltzmann did not reduce thermodynamics to Newton-
Laplace trajectories of particles. He assumed “molecular
chaos”, which is far away from the Newton-Laplace mathe-
matical frame of an entailed trajectory in the momentum /
position phase space, and unified asymptotically the molec-
ular approach and the II principle of thermodynamics. As
a matter of fact, given the ergodic hypothesis, in the ther-
modynamic integral, an infinite sum, the ratio of particles
over a volume stabilizes only at the infinite limit of both.
In short, the ergodic hypothesis allows Boltzmann to ignore
the entailed newtonian trajectory. The unit of analysis is
the volume of each microstate in the phase space.
Thus, there is no reason in biology to claim that the fun-
damental must be conceptually elementary (molecular), as
this is false also in physics.
Moreover, the proper elementary observable doesn’t need
to be simple. “Elementary particles” are not conceptually
/ mathematically simple, in quantum field theories nor in
string theory. In biology, the elementary living component,
the cell, is (very) complex, a further anti-Cartesian stand at
the core of our proposal: a cell is already a Kantian whole.
As a matter of fact, Kant pointed out that in an “orga-
nized being” the parts exist for and by means of the whole,
the whole exists for and by means of the parts. The parts
perform tasks, typically subsets of their causal consequences,
that can be defined only because they are part of a Kantian
whole. No reduction to the parts allows understanding of the
whole because the relevant degrees of freedom of the parts as
associated to the whole are functional (compatibility within
the whole and of the whole in the ecosystem) and definable
as components of the causal consequences of physical prop-
erties of the parts, while the microscopic degrees of freedom
of the parts are understood as physical. By this, they include
all the causal consequences of the parts. Further, because of
the non-ergodicity of the universe above the level of atoms,
where most molecules and organs will never exist, a selec-
tive account of the function of a part of a Kantian whole
that participates in the continued existence of that whole
in the non-ergodic universe has concrete physical as well as
biological meaning. More, in a sense, ergodicity would pre-
vent selection since since it would mean that a negatively
selected phenotype would “come back” anyway.
As mentioned above and further discussed below, the the-
oretical frame establishes the pertinent observables and pa-
rameters, i.e. the ever changing and unprestatable phase
space of evolution.
In biology, we consider observable and parameters that
are derived from or pertinent to Darwinian evolution and
this is fundamental for our approach. Their very definition
depends on the intended Kantian whole and its integration
in and regulation by an ecosystem. Selection, acting at the
level of the evolving Kantian whole in its environment, se-
lects on functions (thus on and by organs in an organism) as
interacting with an ecosystem. But the unprestatable task
closure achieved by the Kantian whole in its niche can only
be revealed after the fact by what has succeeded in selection.
Thus, the niche itself is co-specified after the selective fact
with the Kantian whole in a circular way.
Consider for example the crystalline in a vertebrate eye,
or the kidney. Both these organs and their functions did
not exist before the organisms with crystalline and kidneys
were formed. Thus, if we consider the proper biological ob-
servable (crystalline, kidney), each phenotypic consequence
or set of consequences of a chemical (enzymatic) activity
has an a priori indefinite and unorderable, hence algorith-
mically undefinable set of potential uses, not pre-definable in
the language of physics. Similarly, a membrane bound small
protein serving a different function, which by Darwinian pre-
adaptation or Gould’s exaptation, may later become part
of the flagellar motor of a bacterium; similarly the double
jaws of some vertebrate of 200 million years ago will yield
the middle ear bones of today’s vertebrates. There was no
mathematical need for the phenotype nor for the function,
“listening”, in the physical world. In short, for any single or
indefinite set of parts and processes, their causal and quan-
tum relations may find some use alone or together, which
may allow or increase the capacity of the living being to sur-
vive in a new selective environment. That environment may
consist of other forms of life as in a mixed ecological commu-
nity co-evolving with one another often by preadaptations
and exaptations. Thus, since the uses of one or many parts
or processes alone or together is both indefinite in number
and unorderable, we cannot predefine nor, a fortiori, mathe-
matize and algorithmically list those uses ahead of time nor
what shall come into existence in the evolving biosphere. In
other plain words, we cannot write down equations of mo-
tion for these unprestatable, co-constituted, newly relevant
observables and parameters in evolution. As emphasized, by
contrast, in physics, laws as equations, dynamics and con-
tour conditions are given in pre-defined phase spaces.
Organisms withstand the intrinsic unstability / unpre-
dictability of the changing phase space, by their relative au-
tonomy. They have an internal, permanently reconstructed
autonomy, in Kant’s sense, or Varela’s autopoiesis, that gives
them an ever changing, yet “inertial” structural stability.
They achieve a closure in a task space by which they repro-
duce, and evolve and adapt by processes alone or together
out of the indefinite and unorderable set of uses, of finding
new uses to sustain this in the ongoing evolution of the bio-
sphere. These uses are indefinite as they constitute, when vi-
able, new biological functions and organs, depending on the
context. We will formulate this in a physico-mathematical
way in section 7. They are unorderable, since variability
and diversity manifests itself as the “branching” of evolu-
tion, where structure and function of the resulting organs
and organisms are on different branches and, by this, un-
comparable — both notions are, of course, epistemic, as we
may ”locally” propose phase spaces and order, whenever this
adds to intelligibility of nature.
This situation leads us to introduce the notion of enable-
ment, that we will first define as the role played by a part
with respect to the formation of a new observable (mathe-
matically, a new dimension) of the phase space. Examples
are given in the next section and we will refine this notion
throughout the article.
Let’s summarize this section. In biology selection acts at
the level of the whole organism, or what we call a Kantian
whole, where as noted above, the function of a part is given
by its role in sustaining the whole. Other consequences of
the part are side effects. Then selection acting at the level of
the Kantian whole, thereby picks out and reveals, after the
fact, novel functions and eco-systemic interactions, which
are co-constituted by the Kantian whole and its environ-
ment as a “task closure” required for reproduction of the
Kantian whole in a biological niche. This niche, which is
indefinite in features prior to selection revealing what will
co-constitute “task closure” for the Kantian whole, allows
the tasks’ closure by which an organism survives and repro-
duces. In contrast to prestated phase spaces in physics, the
biologically pertinent phase space is given by the newly rel-
evant observables and the parameters that are needed for
the intended analysis, based on life’s proliferation, variation
and selection. The pertinent observables and parameters,
thus the components of the phase space, are the ones that
are unprestatble and ever newly relevant for biological func-
tions and interactions. And this is a key point: nothing in
biology makes sense, if not analyzed in evolutionary terms.
We will summarize the observables as the “phenotype”, that
is, as the various (epistemic) components of an organism
(organs, functions, interactions . . . ). Thus, it is prolifera-
tion, variation and selection grafting novel phenotypes into
evolving organisms that reveals, again after the fact, the
newly relevant and unprestatable observables and parame-
ters. Thereby, this is our main thesis, the very phase space
of evolution changes in unprestatable ways. In consequence,
again, we can write no equations of motion for the evolving
biosphere, nor know ahead of time the niche boundary con-
ditions so cannot integrate the equations of motion which we
do not have. No law entails the evolution of the biosphere.
5. EXAMPLES
Darwinian preadaptations are causal consequences of a
part of an organism of no selective significance in the cur-
rent environment, which happen to be compatible in a new
selective environment where they are thereby selected and
so “enabled”. Here we wish to stress the difference between
such evolutionary “enablement” for which no entailing law
can be found, and entailed trajectories in physics. Then,
typically a new biological function comes into existence.
Example 1. Swim bladders afford neutral buoyancy in the
water column by virtue of the ratio of air to water in
the bladder. The preadaptation of the swim bladder
derived from the lungs of lung fishes (see [25, 32] for
more detailed analyses). Water got into some lungs.
Now a sac existed with air and water in it, poised to
evolve into a swim bladder. With the swim bladder, a
new function, neutral buoyancy in the water column,
arose. We now ask a fundamental question: Can we
name all the possible Darwinian preadaptations, just
for humans, in the next three million years? We all
say “No”. Why? A first statement of why is that we
cannot name all possible selective environments. Nor
could we know we had completed the list. Nor could
we prestate the one or many features of one or many
organisms that might constitute the preadaptation.
Another view of this is the following: once lung fish ex-
isted, swim bladders were in the “adjacent possible” of
the evolution of the biosphere by Darwinian preadap-
tations. But we do not know what all the possibil-
ities are for such preadaptation, so do not know the
unprestatable and ever changing phase space of evolu-
tion. Not only do we not know what “will” happen, we
do not even know what “can” happen.
Yet there is more: Once the swim bladder existed,
it thereby constituted a new empty adjacent possible
niche. A bacterium or worm might evolve to live only
in swim bladders. But before the unprestatable emer-
gence of the swim bladder, we do not know the new
empty adjacent possible niche. Yet that niche consti-
tutes the new boundary conditions on natural selec-
tion molding the evolution of the bacterium or worm.
Again, without laws of motion or knowledge of the
boundary conditions, we can have no law entailing the
evolution of the biosphere.
This leads to both enablement and radical emergence:
The swim bladder was probably selected in a popula-
tion of fish to function as a swim bladder, but the swim
bladder itself as a new adjacent possible empty niche
was not selected as a niche, as such. Yet it changes
the possible directions of evolution as a worm or bac-
terium may evolve to live in it. But this means that
jointly to but beyond selection, the biosphere creates,
by variability, recombination and new unpredictable
uses, its own possibilities of future evolution, that is
radical emergence of life from life. Further, both in the
sense that quantum acausal processes of mutation may
underlie the evolution of the worm, and the deeper fact
that no law entails the evolution of the biosphere, the
new adjacent possible empty niche does not “cause”,
but does “enable” the emergence of a new direction in
the evolution of the biosphere.
Example 2. The bones of the double jaw of some verte-
brates evolved into the bones of the middle ears of
vertebrates. A new function, hearing, emerged as the
“bricolage” of old structures. The same considerations
apply to this case of preadaptation as to the evolution
of the swim bladder.
Example 3. The flagella of some bacteria are the “brico-
lage” of previous components of proteins, which origi-
nally had various, unrelated, functions [18]. Again, the
same considerations apply as those to the evolution of
the swim bladder.
6. SYMMETRY
We will understand the historically robust “structure of
determination of physics” (which includes unpredictability)
by observing that, since Noether and Weyl, physical laws
may be described in terms of theoretical symmetries in the
intended equations (of the“dynamics”, in a general sense, see
below). These symmetries in particular express the funda-
mental conservation laws of the physical observables (energy,
momentum, charges . . . ), both in classical and quantum
physics. And the conservation properties allow us to com-
pute (they mathematically entail) the trajectories of physi-
cal objects as geodetics, by extremizing the pertinent func-
tionals (Hamilton principle applied to the Langrangian func-
tionals), even in Quantum Mechanics, as they allow us to
derive the Schro¨dinger equation.
Note that physics started by first analyzing “trajectories”,
from Aristotle to Galileo. Only with the invention of an (an-
alytic) geometry of space (Descartes), could trajectories be
placed in a pre-given space, which later became the absolute
space of Newtonian laws. As a matter of fact, there is no
underlying or background space even in Greek Geometry,
which is just a Geometry of figures, handled by rotations
and translations (thus, by symmetries). The invention of
Descartes spaces was needed for doing both geometry and
physics in a pre-stated “background” space. Galileo’s theory
provided, by inertia, the conservation law for analyzing the
physical invariance, when moving from one Cartesian ref-
erence system to another (in modern terms, Galileo’s sym-
metry group defines the transformations between reference
frames and the corresponding invariants).
The invention of the more general notion of “phase space”
dates of the late XIX century, when momentum was added
to space as an integral component of the analysis of a tra-
jectory (or energy to time, in order to apply the correspond-
ing conservation properties, thus the corresponding theoret-
ical symmetries). In general, the phase spaces are the right
spaces of description in the sense that they allow one to spec-
ify “trajectories”: if one considers a smaller space, processes
would not have a determined trajectory but would be able
to behave arbitrarily.
In summary, the historical and conceptual development of
physics went as follows:
• analyze trajectories
• pull-out the key observables as (relative) invariants (as
given by the symmetries)
• construct out of them the intended phase space.
Physical (phase) spaces, thus, are not “already there”, as
absolutes underlying phenomena: they are our remarkable
and very effective invention in order to make physical phe-
nomena intelligible [30, 4]. This approach does not work as
for biological observables, we argue.
Thus, the modern work of the physicist begins by setting
the phase space and the measure in it, on the grounds of the
observables he/she picks out in the “trajectories”, which are
meant here in the broadest sense, like in Quantum Physics,
where quanta do not go along trajectories, but the wave
function does. As for the mathematics, from Descartes’
spaces, invented for accommodating all possible physical tra-
jectories and states, up to the subsequent more general phase
spaces, all these spaces are finitistically (axiomatically) de-
scribable, because of their symmetries. That is, their reg-
ularities, as invariants and invariant preserving transforma-
tions in the intended spaces (thus their symmetries), allow a
finite description, even if they are infinite or even of infinite
dimension.
Consider, say, a tri-(or more) dimensional Cartesian space,
since Newton our preferred space. It is infinite, but the
three straight lines are given by symmetries (they are axis
of rotations) and their right angles as well (right angles,
says Euclid, are defined from the most symmetric figure you
obtain when crossing two straight lines)5. These symmetries
allow us to describe this infinite space in a very synthetic
way.
The situation is just slightly more general for a Hilbert
space, even of infinite dimension or in other more general
cases: mathematics is a science of invariants and invariant
preserving transformations, thus of symmetries. These in-
variants (symmetries) allow us to handle formally infinity in
finitely many words. Note that symmetries, in mathematics,
have the peculiar status of being both invariant (structural
invariants, say) and invariant preserving transformations (as
symmetry groups).
In conclusion, in physics the observables, which yield the
phase space, derive from the invariants / symmetries in the
trajectories. More exactly, they derive from the invariants
and the invariant preserving transformations in the intended
physical theory. So, Poincare´’s momentum is preserved in
the dynamics, similarly as Carnot’s product pV is preserved
at constant temperature while p and V may vary. Then one
uses these invariants in order to construct the “background
space” where the phenomena under analysis can be accom-
modated. That is, the conceptual construction of the phase
space follows the choice of the relevant observables and in-
variants (symmetries) in the physico-mathematical analysis.
As for biology, let’s go back to our key question: why are
we talking of phenotypes, as observables in the biological
phase spaces? The main lesson we learn from 20th century
physics is that the construction of scientific objectivity (and
even of the pertinent objects of science) begins when one
gives explicitly the reference system (or phase space) and
the metric (the measurement) on it. We do not consider
anymore ether or phlogiston or ghosts as pertinent observ-
ables nor parameters, thus they have been excluded from our
phase spaces. Since Poincare´ we learned to add momentum
to position and time. Thermodynamics used, as observable
forming the phase space, pressure, volume and temperature.
Statistical physics considers ensembles of systems. Quan-
tum mechanics takes as state function a probability density
in possibly infinite dimensional Hilbert or Fock spaces. As
mentioned above, invariants and symmetries allowed these
constructions of suitable phase spaces.
Note that in statistical mechanics one may work with a
randomly varying number n of particles. Thus, the dimen-
5More generally, modern Category Theory defines Carte-
sian products in terms of a symmetric commuting dia-
gram. Hilbert and Fock’s spaces require a more complex
but conceptually similar definition, in terms of invariants
and their associated transformations. When adding the dif-
ferent groups of transformations (the symmetries) that al-
low one to relativize the intended spaces, one obtains the
various physical theories that beautifully organize the inert
matter, up to today, e.g. Relativity Theory with its group
of Poincare´-Lorentz symmetries.
sion of the state space stricto sensu, which is 6n, is not pre-
defined. This situation does not, however, lead to relevant
difficulties because the possibilities are known (the particles
have known nature) and the probabilities of each phase space
are given6. In other terms, even if the exact finite dimension
of the space may be unknown, it has a known probability
— we know the probability it will grow by 1, 2 or more di-
mensions. The possible extra particles have perfectly known
possible properties and states: the pertinent observables and
parameters are known, one just misses: how many? And this
becomes a new parameter . . . (see for example [26]).
In quantummechanics, in order to deal with phase spaces,
which are just partially known, a powerful tool, the “density
matrix”, has been developed. In such cases, physicists work
with the part of the state space that is known and the den-
sity matrix takes into account that the system can end up
in an unknown region of the state space, by a component
called “leakage term”. The point is that this term interferes
with the rest of the dynamics in a determined way, which
allows us to capture theoretically the situation in spite of
the leakage term.
In Quantum Field Theory (QFT) it is even more chal-
lenging: particles and anti-particles may be created spon-
taneously. And so one uses infinite dimensional Hilbert’s
spaces and Fock spaces or alike to accommodate them. Of
course, quanta are all identical in their different classes: a
new electron is an electron . . . they all have the same observ-
able properties. More precisely, the analysis by Feynman
diagrams allows us to provide the weight in the quantum
state of each possible spontaneous creation and annihilation
of particles (and, basically, the more complex a diagram is,
the smaller its weight).
In all these cases, the analysis of trajectories or the choice
of the object to study (recall the case of the thermodynamic
cycle or the law of probability for QM, above) preceded the
proposal of the pertinent phase space, which contains the
proper observables and parameters for the trajectories of
the intended object. Then, as mentioned above, the sym-
metries of these spaces allowed synthetic, even axiomatic,
definitions of these infinite spaces, even of infinite dimen-
sion. In other words, the finite description of these possibly
infinite spaces, from Descartes to Quantum spaces, is made
possible by their regularities: they are given in terms of
mathematical symmetries.
7. CHANGING SYMMETRIES
We will gradually move now towards biology, by contin-
uing though to develop cross references to physics. Our
approach is an answer to the physicalist views, often very
weakly motivated, but also to many pertinent comments or
objections we received from competent colleagues who still
prefer to transfer the theoretical approaches to the inert in
order to deal also with the living state of the matter.
Since symmetries and the related conservation properties
have a major role in physics, it is interesting to consider
the paradigmatic case where symmetry changes are at the
core of the analysis: critical transitions [5]. In these state
6In general, n changes either because of chemical reactions,
and it is then their rate which is relevant, or because the
system is open, in which case the flow of particles is similar
to an energetic flow, that is the number of particles plays the
same role as energy: they are both fluctuating quantitities
obeying conservation laws.
transitions, “something is not preserved”. In general, this
is expressed by the fact that some symmetries are broken
or new ones are obtained after the transition (symmetry
changes, corresponding to state changes). At the transition,
typically, there is the passage to a new “coherence struc-
ture” (a non-trivial scale symmetry); mathematically, this is
described by the non-analyticity of the pertinent formal de-
velopment. Consider the classical para-ferromagnetic tran-
sition: the system goes from a disordered state to sudden
common orientation of spins, up to the complete ordered
state of a unique orientation. Or percolation, often based
on the formation of fractal structures, that is the iteration
of a statistically invariant motif. Similarly for the forma-
tion of a snow flake . . . . In all these circumstances, a “new
physical object of observation” is formed. Most of the cur-
rent analyses deal with transitions at equilibrium; the less
studied and more challenging case of far form equilibrium
critical transitions may require new mathematical tools, or
variants of the powerful renormalization methods. These
methods change the pertinent object, yet they are based on
symmetries and conservation properties such as energy or
other invariants. That is, one obtains a new object, yet not
necessarily new observables for the theoretical analysis. An-
other key mathematical aspect of renormalization is that it
analyzes point-wise transitions, that is, mathematically, the
physical transition is seen as happening in an isolated mathe-
matical point (isolated with respect to the interval topology,
or the topology induced by the usual measurement and the
associated metrics).
One can say in full generality that a mathematical frame
completely handles the determination of the object it de-
scribes as long as no strong enough singularity (i.e. relevant
infinity or divergences) shows up to break this very math-
ematical determination [2]. In classical statistical fields (at
criticality) and in quantum field theories this leads to the
necessity of using renormalization methods [11, 33]. The
point of these methods is that when it is impossible to han-
dle mathematically all the interaction of the system in a
direct manner (because they lead to infinite quantities and
therefore to no relevant account of the situation), one can
still analyze parts of the interactions in a systematic man-
ner, typically within arbitrary scale intervals. This allows us
to exhibit a symmetry between partial sets of “interactions”,
when the arbitrary scales are taken as a parameter.
In this situation, the intelligibility still has an “upward”
flavor since renormalization is based on the stability of the
equational determination when one considers a part of the
interactions occurring in the system. Now, the “locus of the
objectivity” is not in the description of the parts but in the
stability of the equational determination when taking more
and more interactions into account. This is true for crit-
ical phenomena, where the parts, atoms for example, can
be objectivized outside the system and have a characteristic
scale. In general, though, only scale invariance matters and
the contingent choice of a fundamental (atomic) scale is ir-
relevant. Even worse, in quantum fields theories, the parts
are not really separable from the whole (this would mean to
separate an electron from the field it generates) and there is
no relevant elementary scale which would allow one to get
rid of the infinities (and again this would be quite arbitrary,
since the objectivity needs the inter-scale relationship), see
for example [33].
In short, even in physics there are situations where the
whole is not the sum of the parts because the parts cannot be
summed on (this is not specific to quantum fields and is also
relevant for classical fields, in principle). In these situations,
the intelligibility is obtained by the scale symmetry which
is why fundamental scale choices are arbitrary with respect
to this phenomena.
This choice of the object of quantitative and objective
analysis is at the core of the scientific enterprise: looking
only at molecules as the only pertinent observable of life is
worse than reductionist, it is against the history of physics
and its audacious unifications and invention of new observ-
ables, scale invariances and even conceptual frames.
As for criticality in biology, there exists substantial em-
pirical evidence that living organisms undergo critical tran-
sitions [1, 17, 29]. These are mostly analyzed as limit situa-
tions, either never really reached by an organism or as occa-
sional point-wise transitions. Or also, as researchers nicely
claim in specific analysis: a biological system, a cell genetic
regulatory networks, brain and brain slices . . . are “poised at
criticality” [24, 21]. In other words, critical state transitions
happen continually.
Thus, as for the pertinent observables, the phenotypes, we
propose to understand evolutionary trajectories as cascades
of critical transitions, thus of symmetry changes. In this
perspective, one cannot pre-give, nor formally pre-define,
the phase space for the biological dynamics, in contrast to
what has been done for the profound mathematical frame for
physics. This does not forbid a scientific analysis of life. This
may just be given in different terms. We currently work, for
example, at the mathematical analysis of these cascades of
symmetry changes in embryogenesis and their role as for the
variability of embryogenetic trajectories. Below we propose
a positive science that analyses the worlds Kantian wholes
mutually make.
As for evolution, there is no possible equational entail-
ment nor a causal structure of determination derived from
such entailment, as in physics. The point is that these are
better understood and correlated, since the work of Noether
and Weyl in the last century, as symmetries in the intended
equations, where they express the underlying invariants and
invariant preserving transformations. No theoretical sym-
metries, no equations, thus no laws and no entailed causes
allow the mathematical deduction of biological trajectories
in pre-given phase spaces — at least not in the deep and
strong sense established by the physico-mathematical the-
ories. Observe that the robust, clear, powerful physico-
mathematical sense of entailing law has been permeating all
sciences, including societal ones, economics among others. If
we are correct, this permeating physico-mathematical sense
of entailing law must be given up for unentailed diachronic
evolution in biology, in economic evolution, and cultural evo-
lution.
As a fundamental example of symmetry change, observe
that mitosis yields different proteome distributions, differ-
ences in DNA or DNA expressions, in membranes or or-
ganelles: the symmetries are not preserved. In a multi-
cellular organism, each mitosis asymmetrically reconstructs
a new coherent “Kantian whole”, in the sense of the physics
of critical transitions: a new tissue matrix, new collagen
structure, new cell-to-cell connections . . . . And we undergo
millions of mitosis each minute. More, this is not “noise”:
this is variability, which yields diversity, which is at the core
of evolution and even of stability of an organism or an ecosys-
tem. Organisms and ecosystems are structurally stable, also
because they are Kantian wholes that permanently and non-
identically reconstruct themselves: they do it in an always
different, thus adaptive, way. They change the coherence
structure, thus its symmetries. This reconstruction is thus
random, but also not random, as it heavily depends on con-
straints, such as the proteins types imposed by the DNA,
the relative geometric distribution of cells in embryogene-
sis, interactions in an organism, in a niche, but also on the
opposite of constraints, the autonomy of Kantian wholes.
In the interaction with the ecosystem, the evolutionary
trajectory of an organism is characterized and partially de-
fined by the co-constitution of new interfaces, i.e. new func-
tions and organs that are the proper observables for the
Darwinian analysis. And the change of a (major) function
induces a change in the global Kantian whole as a coherence
structure, that is it changes the internal symmetries: the fish
with the new bladder will swim differently, its heart-vascular
system will relevantly change . . . .
Organisms transform the ecosystem while transforming
themselves and they can stand/do it because they have an
internal preserved universe (Bernard’s ”milieu interior”). Its
stability is maintained also by slightly, yet constantly chang-
ing internal symmetries. The notion of extended criticality
in biology (life is always in an extended critical transition
with respect to all the pertinent parameters, see [4, 19]) fo-
cuses on the dynamics of symmetry changes and provides
an insight into the permanent, ontogenetic and evolutionary
adaptability, as long as these changes are compatible with
the co-constituted Kantian whole and the ecosystem. As we
said, autonomy is integrated in and regulated by constraints,
with an organism itself and of an organism within an ecosys-
tem. Autonomy makes no sense without constraints and
constraints apply to an autonomous Kantian whole. So con-
straints shape autonomy, which in turn modifies constraints,
within the margin of viability, i. e. within the limits of the
interval of extended criticality. The extended critical tran-
sition proper to the biological dynamics does not allow one
to prestate the symmetries and the correlated phase space.
Consider, say, a microbial ecosystem in a human. It has
some 150 different microbial species in the intestinal tract.
Each person’s ecosystem is unique, and tends largely to be
restored following antibiotic treatment. Each of these mi-
crobes is a Kantian whole, and in ways we do not under-
stand yet, the “community” in the intestines co-creates their
worlds together, co-creating the niches by which each and
all achieve, with the surrounding human tissue, a task clo-
sure that is “always” sustained even if it may change by
immigration of new microbial species into the community
and extinction of old species in the community. With such
community membership turnover, or community assembly,
the phase space of the system is undergoing continual and
open ended changes. Moreover, given the rate of mutation
in microbial populations, it is very likely that these micro-
bial communities are also co-evolving with one another on
a rapid time scale. Again, the phase space is continually
changing as are the symmetries.
Can one have a complete description of actual and po-
tential biological niches? If so, the description seems to
be incompressible, in the sense that any linguistic descrip-
tion may require new names and meanings for the new un-
prestable functions, where functions and their names make
only sense in the newly co-constructed biological and histor-
ical (linguistic) environment. Even for existing niches, short
descriptions are given from a specific perspective (they are
very epistemic), looking at a purpose, say. One finds out a
feature in a niche, because you observe that if it goes away
the intended organisms dies. In other terms, niches are com-
pared by differences: one may not be able to prove that two
niches are identical or equivalent (in supporting life), but
one may show that two niches are different. Once more,
there are no symmetries organizing over time these spaces
and their internal relations. Mathematically, no symmetry
(groups) nor (partial-)order (semigroups) organize the phase
spaces of phenotypes, in contrast to physical phase spaces.
In order to summarize these preliminary remarks, it should
be clear that our aim is to show that the powerful methods
of physics that allowed us to pre-define phase spaces on the
grounds of the observables and the invariants in the ”tra-
jectories” (the symmetries in the equations) do not apply in
biology.
Finally, here is one of the many logical challenges posed
by evolution: the circularity of the definition of niches is
more than the circularity in the definitions. The “in the
definitions” circularity concerns the quantities (or quantita-
tive distributions) of given observables. Typically, a numer-
ical function defined by recursion or by impredicative tools
yields a circularity in the definition and poses no mathemat-
ical nor logical problems, in contemporary logic (this is so
also for recursive definitions of metabolic cycles in biology,
see [22]. Similarly, a river flow, which shapes its own bor-
der, presents technical difficulties for a careful equational
description of its dynamics, but no mathematical nor logical
impossibility: one has to optimize a highly non linear and
large action/reaction system, yielding a dynamically con-
structed geodetic, the river path, in perfectly known phase
spaces (momentum and space or energy and time, say, as
pertinent observables and variables).
The circularity “of the definitions” applies, instead, when
it is impossible to prestate the phase space, so the very
novel interaction (including the “boundary conditions” in
the niche and the biological dynamics) co-defines new ob-
servables. The circularity then radically differs from the one
in the definition, since it is at the meta-theoretical (meta-
linguistic) level: which are the observables and variables to
put in the equations? It is not just within prestatable yet
circular equations within the theory (ordinary recursion and
extended non—linear dynamics), but in the ever changing
observables, the phenotypes and the biological functions in
a circularly co-specified niche. From this follows our state-
ment that, mathematically and logically, no law entails the
evolution of the biosphere.
8. ENABLEMENT, CAUSALITY AND RAN-
DOMNESS
8.1 The Terminus of a Physics Worldview at
the Watershed of Life
The instability of biological theoretical symmetries is not,
of course, the end of science, but it is the terminus of the flat
transfer of physico-mathematical methods of physics, taught
us from Newton onward, to biology. In biological evolution
we cannot use the same very rich interaction with mathe-
matics at the core of physical theories. Consequently, our
analysis, if correct, puts an end, a fortiori, to any form of
reductionism, either to existing physical theories or to the
even simpler theories of information, either Shannon or Tur-
ing, both embedded in the fragments of current mathemat-
ics dealing with discrete structures and data types, whose
phase spaces are even more strictly pre-given. Because the
ever changing phase space of biological evolution cannot be
prestated and its sample space is not statable, one cannot
compute “the entropy of the Source”, a la Shannon, nor
can one define the algorithmic generation of a sequence of
prestated symbols, a la Turing.
The scientific answer we propose to this end of the phys-
icalist certitudes, is based on an analysis of the notion of
“enablement” in evolution (and ontogenesis, to be discussed
elsewhere). In turn the enablement concerns how Kantian
wholes co-create their worlds such that they can exist in the
non-ergodic universe above the level of atoms.
Our thesis then is that evolution as a “diachronic process”
of becoming (but ontogenesis as well) just “enables”, but
does not cause, the forthcoming state of affairs, in the sense
specified below. Our point of view reflects the fact that New-
ton’s entailed trajectories mathematized Aristotle’s“efficient
cause”. In short, in our view, such entailed causal relations
must be replaced by “enablement” relations, in evolutionary
biology.
Typically, a niche enables the survival of an otherwise in-
compatible/impossible form of life, it does not cause it. At
most, a cause may be found in the ”difference” (a muta-
tion, say) that induced the phenotypic variation at stake, as
spelled out below.
This new perspective will be motivated, on one side, by
the understanding of physical “causes and determinations”
in terms of symmetries, along the lines above of modern
physics; on the other, by an analysis of biological “trajecto-
ries” in phylogenesis (and ontogenesis), as continual symme-
try changes. We claim that without invariances and sym-
metries, thus (possibly equational) laws, entailed “causes”
cannot be defined. As part of this understanding, we will
discuss unentailed causal relations in a restricted sense, in
terms of “differential causes”.
In summary, in biology, there is no way to extract the
pertinent biological observables as invariant properties, pre-
served by mathematical symmetries, and then transfer these
observables to a“background phase space”, as physicists did,
since (Galileo and) Newton, by using first Descartes’ spaces,
then by inventing more general phase spaces (e. g. Hilbert
spaces). In short, life, unentailed, “bubbles forth” (as Hera-
clitus said 2500 years ago) and organisms (their phenotypes)
co-constitute their own phase space. Kantian Autonomy and
constraints and affordances of the environment are the two
faces of the same medal, dynamically shaping each other. As
remarked in the Overview, an organism exists as a Kantian
whole by virtue of a closure in some set of “tasks” by which
it reproduces. But these tasks can typically only be com-
pleted via the biotic and abiotic environment. In turn, in
evolving Kantian wholes under natural selection acting on
those wholes, only after the selective fact are the relevant
features of the tasks, their closure, and the niche revealed.
Thus the tasks and the niche are circularly co-constituted
by selection acting on the evolving population of organisms.
The Kantian whole with its task closure and its niche are
both not separately specifiable, nor prestatable prior to the
results of selection.
8.2 Causes and Enablement
Since symmetries are unstable, causality in biology cannot
be understood as “entailed causality” as in physics and this
will lead us to the proposal that “causal relations are only
differential causes”. If a bacterium causes pneumonia, or a
mutation causes one of the rare monogenetic diseases (ane-
mia falciformis, say), this is a cause and it is differential, i.
e. it is a difference with respect to what is fairly considered
”normal” and causes an anormality in the phenotype.
A classical mistake is to say: this mutation causes an id-
iot child (a famous genetic disorder, phenylketonuria), thus
. . . the gene affected by the mutation is the gene of intelli-
gence, or: here is the gene that causes/determines the intel-
ligence. In logical terms, it consists in deducing from “notA
implies notB”, that “A implies B”: an amazing mistake. All
that we know is a causal correlation of differences.
We then propose to consider things differently. The sin-
gle observed or induced difference, a mutation with a so-
matic effect, a stone bumping on someone’s head, or a car-
cinogen (asbestos) does cause a problem; that is the causal
dictionary is suitable to describe a differential cause-effect
relation. The differential cause modifies the space of pos-
sibilites, that is the compatibility of the organism with the
ecosystem. In other terms, it modifies the ”enablement re-
lations”. In some case, the modified frame may be viable.
In other words, the differential causes modify the coher-
ence structure of an organism, a niche, an ecosystem. So
enablement is modified: a niche may be no longer suitable
for an organism. Either selection may exclude the modified
organism or a change in a niche, due to a differential physical
cause (a climate change, say), may negatively select existing
organisms or act on them differently, since the enablement
relations differ.
Yet, by the following two arguments, we claim that only
the differential relations may be soundly considered causal.
1. In physics, in presence of an explicit equational de-
termination, causes are given by a formal symmetry
breaking in equations. Typically, f = ma, a symmet-
ric relation, means, for Newton, that a force causes
an acceleration, asymmetrically. In a synthetic/naive
way, one may say that Einstein reverses the causal im-
plication, as a space curvature ”causes” an acceleration
that ”causes” a field, thus a force. One may consider
the application of a Newtonian force as a differential
cause, as the inertial movement is the ”default” state
(”nothing happens” if no force is applied). This analy-
sis cannot be transferred to biology, inasmuch sym-
metries are not stable and, thus, one cannot write
equations for phylogenetic trajectories (nor break their
symmetries). Moreover, the default state is far form
being inertia (see below).
2. As just mentioned the default state in physics is iner-
tia. In biology instead, the default state is ”activity”.
In short, following an idea to be developed elsewhere,
the default state is the never identical iteration of a
morphogenetic process, by proliferation and mobility
(see also [27]). In this paper’s terms, the default state
involves continual critical transitions, thus symmetry
changes, thus phase space changes. As a consequence,
an organism, a species, does not need a cause to be
active, e. g. to proliferate and occupy a new niche. It
only needs to be a Kantian whole enabled to survive
by changing.
How do biological niches relate to physical boundary con-
ditions? Consider a billiard table with its four edges which
are the boundary condition on the motion of a billiard ball.
The boundary conditions play a causal role in the motion of
the ball, according to Newton’s third law of motion. Hence
integration of the laws of motion in differential equations
with initial and boundary conditions do yield the future
and past trajectories of the ball. Energy as a conserved
observable allows us to mathematically describe the dynam-
ics. Consider then an adjacent possible empty niche, say the
swim bladder. Is it a boundary condition? Not in the sense
as in physics, since the swim bladder enables the worm or
the bacterium to live and evolve, according to unprestatable
enabling relations: the features of the swim bladder to be
used by the new organism to achieve task closure in its envi-
ronment may be radically new. In contrast, in physics, the
energy conservation properties allow us to derive the equa-
tions of the action/reaction system . . . proper to the physical
phenomenon; all the pertinent observables and symmetries,
in a billiard and balls system, are perfectly known, or com-
pletely pre-given.
In other words, we cannot know ahead of time the co-
constituted observables (functions, typically) of the worm
and swim bladder that allow the worm to live in the swim
bladder. Hence we cannot, even knowing the existence of
the swim bladder, state what features of the swim bladder
as a niche actually constitute the ”actual niche”, or even the
ever changing niche as the worm evolves.
In general, the organism adjusting to a new niche may be
a ”hopeful monster”, in the sense of Goldschmidt, that is the
result of a ”pathology” [9, 12].
The notions of“normal”and“pathological”makes no sense
in physics, where all causes may be considered “differential”.
In a sense, these differing notions allowed us to distinguish
between enablement and causality, due to a difference in
the normal web of interactions. In evolution, a difference (a
mutation) may cause a “pathology”, or a hopeful monster.
But this monster, if not killed by selection, may be enabled
to survive by and in a co-constituted niche.
Thus, besides the centrality of enablement, we may main-
tain the notion of cause — and it would be a mistake to
exclude it from the biological dictionary. As a matter of
fact, one goes to the doctor and rightly asks for the cause
of pneumonia — not only what enabled it: find and kill
the bacterium, please, which is the cause. Yet, that bac-
terium has been enabled to grow excessively by a weak lung,
a defective immune system or bad habits . . . so, the therapy
should not stop at this differential cause, but investigate
enablement as well [23]. And good doctors do it, without
necessarily naming it.
8.3 Randomness
Since Descartes and Galileo’s invention of modern phys-
ical space, both predictable and unpredictable (= random)
events are considered within the pre-determined Cartesian
space of all possible trajectories and phenomena. Newton’s
laws are stated in this pre-given and stable mathematical
space. Of course, hazards (= random events) are possible,
but they occur within a perfectly pre-given space of possi-
bilities: like throwing dice — it is a risk, but within the
six possible outputs, no more, no less. This is why betting
on dices is rational: one can compute the probabilities and
evaluate the risk. That is, randomness is “measurable” and
its measure is given by probability theory, since Pascal and
Laplace, a theory of measure in pre-given spaces of possibil-
ities (the pertinent phase spaces).
More precisely, the measure (the probabilities) is given in
terms of (relative) probabilities defined by symmetries with
respect to the observable in a prestated phase space. For
the dice, the probabilities of the 6 outcomes correspond to
the geometrical symmetries of the object. A more sophisti-
cated example is the microcanonical ensemble of statistical
mechanics, where the microstates with the same energy have
the same probability, on the grounds of the ergodic hypoth-
esis.
As a further consequence, we will hint at the need of a
different concept of randomness in biology, since we can-
not apply a normal probability measure to biological unpre-
dictability: in absence of a pre-given space of possibilities,
biological randomness cannot be measured by probabilities,
which are only definable on a prestated phase space or sam-
ple space. This is yet another crucial difference with respect
to the various notions of randomness in physics, which are
all measurable,
Randomness enhances variability and diversity. It is thus
at the core of evolution: it permanently gives diverging evo-
lutionary paths, as theoretical bifurcations in the formation
of phenotypes. And note that variability and diversity are
also a component of the structural stability of organisms,
species and ecosystems, as Kantian wholes alone and to-
gether. Differentiation and diversity within an organism, a
species and an ecosystem contribute to their viability and
robustness.
Note finally, and this is crucial, that mutations, as one
of the primary (differential) causes of the phylogenetic drift
underlying evolution, must be understood in terms of a ”non-
conservation principle” of biological observables. This is the
exact opposite of the symmetries and conservation prop-
erties that govern physics and the related equational and
causal approaches. There is of course structural stability, in
biology, which means similar, but never identical iteration
of phenotypes. Yet, evolution requires also and intrinsically
a non-conservation principle in order to be made intelligible.
Moreover, phenomena of convergent evolution shape sim-
ilarly organs and organisms. For example, as noted above,
the convergent evolution of the octopus and vertebrate eye
may also follow, on one side, random quantum based acausal
and indeterminate mutations, but, on the other, it is also
”non-random” as both eyes converge to analogous biologi-
cal structures, probably due to physical and biological sim-
ilar constraints — acting as co-constituted borders or as
selection. The convergent evolution of marsupial and mam-
malian forms, like the Tasmanian wolf and mammalian wolf
are other examples of convergent, non-random components
of evolution, in the limited sense above.
In these situations with a superposition of quantum and
classical physics, the remarkable coexistence of indetermi-
nate acausal quantum mutations and non-random conver-
gence to the camera eye, hence quantum random acausal,
indeterminate yet also non-random, comes from the fact that
we are not considering a stable phase space: these examples
are not similar to a dice which falls two times on the same
side (or two quantum measurements that yield the same re-
sult). On the contrary, we have two biological trajectories
which end up constituting similar symmetries and a simi-
lar function. And this happens without a prestated space,
with stable underlying symmetries, which would allow us to
provide a measure of the chance for it to happen.
Conversely, evolution may give divergent answers to the
same or to similar physical constraints. That is, the same
function, moving for example, or breathing, may be bio-
logically implemented in very different ways. For example,
tracheas in insects versus vertebrates’ lungs (combined with
the vascular system), due both to different contexts (differ-
ent biological internal and external constraints) and random
symmetry changes in evolutionary paths.
More generally, conservation or optimality properties of
physical observables (the various forms of physical energy,
for example) cannot help to determine the evolutionary tra-
jectory of an organism. No principle of “least free energy”
(or “least time consumption of free energy”, if it applies)
can help to predict or understand the formation of a proper
biological observable, the organism as object of selection.
Only locally, i. e. the form of some organs, where ex-
change of matter or energy dominates (lungs, vascular sys-
tem, phyllotaxis . . . ), may be shaped by the dominating
physical forces and, thus, their forms follow causally opti-
mality principles (fractal structures or alike, typically).
Yet, very different biological answers to the “same” phys-
ical context make phenotypes incomparable, in terms of
physical optima: production of energy or even exchanging
oxygen may be dealt with in very different ways, by organ-
isms in the“same”ecosystem. Moreover, in terms of physical
or also biological observables, the front legs of an elephant
are not better nor worst than those of a Kangaroo: front
podia of tetrapodes diverged (broke symmetries differently)
in different biological niches and with respect to different in-
ternal milieu. And none of the issuing paths is “better” than
the other, nor followed physical optimality criteria, even less
biological ones: each is just a possible variation on an origi-
nal common theme, just compatible with the co-constituted
ecosystem that enabled them. In general, there is no way
to define a real valued (Lagrangian) functional to be ex-
tremized as for biological functions, as this would require an
ordered space (a real valued functional), where “this biolog-
ical function (or phenotype)” could be said to be “better”
than “that biological function (or phenotype)”.
Note that this un-comparability (or absence of even a
partial order between phenotypes), is also due to the rel-
ative/partial independence of niches. The latter are co-
constituted by organisms. Niches enable what evolves.
9. CONCLUSION
We stressed the role of invariance, symmetries and con-
servation properties in physical theories. In biology, sym-
metries at the phenotypic level, are continually changed,
beginning with the least mitosis, up to the “structural bi-
furcations”which yield speciations in evolution. Thus, there
are no biological symmetries that are a priori preserved,
except and for some time, some basic structures such as
bauplans (still more or less deeply modified during evolu-
tion). There are no sufficiently stable mathematical regu-
larities and transformations, to allow an equational and law
like description entailing the phylogenetic and ontogenetic
trajectories. These are cascades of symmetry changes and
thus just cumulative historical dynamics. And each sym-
metry change is associated to a random event (quantum or
classical), at least for the breaking of symmetries, while the
global shaping of the trajectory, by selection say, is also due
to non-random events. In this sense biological trajectories
are generic, that is just possible ones, and yield a historical
result, an individuated, specific organism (see [4, 19]).
As a consequence, this sum of individual and individualiz-
ing histories, co-constituted within an ever changing ecosys-
tem, does not allow a compressed, finite formal description
of the space of possibilities, an actual biological phase space
(functions, phenotypes, organisms): these possibilities are
each the result of an unpredictable sequence of symmetry
breakings, in contrast to the invariant (conservation) prop-
erties which characterize physical“trajectories”, in the broad
sense (extended to Hilbert’s spaces, in Quantum Mechan-
ics). The physical phase spaces have been mathematically
designed, in terms of symmetries, exactly in order to accom-
modate the physical invariants of trajectories. Recall the
interplay between Cartesian Spaces and Galileo’s inertia, at
the foundation of modern physics and its phase spaces; sim-
ilarly for Poincare´-Lorentz groups in Relativity Theory or
Hilbert and Fock’s spaces in QM.
In this sense, there are no laws that entail, as in physics,
the becoming of the biosphere, and a fortiori, the econo-
sphere, or culture or history, or life in general. In the same
sense, geodetic principle mathematically forces physical ob-
jects never to go wrong. A falling stone follows exactly the
gravitational arrow. A river goes along the shortest path
to the sea, it may adjust it by nonlinear well definable in-
teractions as mentioned above, but it will never go wrong.
These are all geodetics. Living entities, instead, go wrong
most of the time: most organisms are extinct, the major-
ity of fecundations, in mammals, do not lead to a birth, an
amoeba does not follows, exactly, a curving gradient — by
retention it would first go along the tangent, then correct the
trajectory, in a protensive action. In short, life goes wrong
most of the time, but it “adjusts” to the environment and
changes the environment, if possible. It maintains itself, al-
ways within an extend critical interval, whose limits are the
edge of death, by changing the observables, the phenotypes,
that is the very nature of the living object.
If we are right in our conclusion, the strong reduction-
ist dream of a theory that entails the full becoming of the
universe is wrong. With life, we reach the end of a physics
worldview that has dominated us since Newton. Yet the
biosphere is magnificent in its enabled, radically emergent
becoming, the most complex system we know of in the uni-
verse. If no law entails this becoming, then our belief that
such entailing law is a necessary condition for the emergence
of highly organized integrated complex systems is wrong. As
Darwin said, “There is a grandeur in this view of life. . . ”,
now seen to be beyond entailing laws. Then we must ask
new scientific questions, for this co-constitution by Kantian
wholes as they co-evolve and make their worlds together
must be a central part of how the biosphere emerges. We
do not begin to understand this co-constitution and enabled
radical emergent becoming in which the biosphere, jointly
to but beyond selection, creates its own future possibilities
of becoming. So too does the evolving econosphere and cul-
ture.
Kantian wholes making worlds with one another in the
biosphere, our approach, is part of a positive science, be-
yond entailing laws, for why the biosphere is the most com-
plex system we know of in the universe and works so well.
And more, we may be able to analyze the growth of the adja-
cent possible as the ever new niches enabled by the Kantian
wholes living together. ”Enablement” allows one or more
Kantian wholes to co-create a world and environment that
allows them to exist in the non-ergodic universe, where most
complex things won’t exist. Yes, life is caught in a causal
web, but lives in a web of enablement and radical emergence.
Two thousand five hundred years ago Heraclitus said, “The
world bubbles forth”. He may not be correct for physics. But
at the watershed of life, we agree: Life bubbles forth.
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